The Siege of Gingee in the 1690s was more than just a military campaign. According to French Governor François Martin of Pondicherry, it was a story of secret deals and betrayal that changed the course of the conflict between the Mughals and Marathas.
The Secret Understanding
François Martin, who was in close contact with both sides, recorded in his memoirs that Zulfikar Khan had reached a secret understanding with Maratha king Rajaram during the siege. This wasn’t loyalty to the Mughal Empire – it was personal ambition.
Zulfikar Khan planned to create an independent principality for himself after Emperor Aurangzeb’s death. He knew that civil wars would follow among Aurangzeb’s sons, putting his own safety at risk. By making peace with the Marathas, he was securing his future.
The False Death Rumor
Martin revealed that Zulfikar Khan and his father Asad Khan spread false news about Aurangzeb’s death, claiming that Shah Alam had become the new emperor. This rumor was so convincing that even Yachama Nayak wrote to the English Governor of Madras about it.
Arrest of Prince Kam Baksh
To further his plans, Zulfikar Khan arrested Prince Kam Baksh, one of Aurangzeb’s sons. Khan led soldiers to the prince’s tent, and in the fighting that followed, many were killed and wounded. The tent was destroyed and the prince was captured.
To justify this shocking action against the emperor’s son, Khan claimed he had found letters proving the prince was secretly communicating with Rajaram. But Martin suggests the real motive was to use the prince as a tool in the power struggle Khan expected after Aurangzeb’s death.
The 1693 Deal
After the Maratha victory at Desur, Zulfikar Khan openly negotiated with Rajaram. In return for 100,000 gold pieces, the Mughals were allowed to leave safely on January 22-23, 1693. Maratha cavalry even escorted them to Wandiwash. However, many valuable items were left behind, including Prince Kam Baksh’s tents and carpets.
According to Martin, this agreement proved the collusion between Rajaram and the two Khans. Their plan was to establish themselves as rulers of the Carnatic with Maratha support, while Rajaram would get the kingdom of Bijapur.
Contemporary Evidence
Other observers also noticed Khan’s strange behavior. The Madras Council recorded in November 1696 that Zulfikar Khan could have taken Gingee and destroyed the Marathas but instead “joined counsel with them.”
Even Bhimsen, a Mughal courtier, accused Zulfikar Khan of treasonable neglect. He noted that Khan could have captured the fort on his first day at Gingee but chose not to, suggesting that “generals prolong operations for their own profit and ease.”
Within the Maratha camp, leaders like Santaji were angry with Rajaram for making deals without consulting them. This caused internal conflicts, leaving Rajaram with only about 1,500 men.
The Aftermath
By late 1694, Zulfikar Khan finally renewed active operations, marching from Wandiwash to attack Chengam fort. But by then, the Marathas had already proclaimed their sovereignty over large parts of the region, including the Cuddapah and Conjeevaram districts.
The Siege of Gingee shows how personal ambition could override imperial loyalty, turning what should have been a straightforward military campaign into a complex web of secret negotiations and betrayal.
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