In the early 18th century, the Carnatic was a battleground of competing ambitions, where Raja Swarup Singh Bundela, commander of Gingee Fort, clashed with the English East India Company over the 1710 capture of two officers, Lieutenant James Hugonin and Ensign Ray. By mid-1711, under the leadership of Deputy Governor Ralph Raworth, Fort St. David intensified its campaign against Swarup Singh, escalating a costly war that devastated the region and strained trade. Drawing from Fort St. David consultations, Fort St. George correspondence, and despatches to England, this blog post chronicles the progress of the war from July 1711 to May 1712, detailing the fierce battles, failed peace efforts, and eventual French mediation, as documented in historical records and relevant to the rich history of Gingee Fort.
Raworth’s Arrival Amid Devastation
When Ralph Raworth arrived at Fort St. David on August 10, 1711, with five English ships to assume the role of Deputy Governor, he inherited a crisis worsened by his predecessor, Mr. Farmer. Farmer had ordered the destruction of a large quantity of grain and approximately 52 villages, including Swarup Singh’s favored town of Yembollum, in the Gingee government’s territory. This “needless act of destruction,” as noted in Fort St. George records, intensified Swarup Singh’s exasperation, raising his demands to 30,000 chuckrams (16,600 pagodas) for the release of the captives. The devastation caused a severe paddy shortage and soaring cotton prices, prompting Indian merchants to complain. The English sent a yacht northward to procure grain, as renters central to the initial dispute had fled and could not be persuaded to return despite inducements, crippling local trade.
The Battle of August 16, 1711: A Tragic Defeat
On the night of August 16, 1711, a desperate battle unfolded near Fort St. David’s bounds when Gingee forces, led by Mahabat Khan with 400 horse and 1,000 foot, seized the walls of Whichimeer. English troops under Lieutenant Coventry and Ensign Somerville were dispatched to counter them, as detailed in an August 18, 1711, letter. The engagement was catastrophic for the English. Ensign Somerville’s cowardice—fleeing and breaking ranks—demoralized the troops, leading to a chaotic retreat. Captured by four horse-keepers, Somerville was tied to a tree and beheaded with a crooked knife after making submissive pleas, described in a Fort St. George letter as eating grass to signify he was “your slave and will be as submissive as your dog.” His “treacherous and rascally” conduct became a scandal among the English, who lamented it as a disgrace.
Lieutenant Coventry, displaying extraordinary courage, was lanced twice and shot through, dying in battle. Captain Roach, attacked on all sides, was left with only 40 men as many peons and officers fled. The Gingee forces suffered an estimated 140–150 men and horses killed or wounded, but Mahabat Khan skillfully withdrew his cavalry to avoid pursuit as Roach reached Fort St. David’s walls. The Council mourned Coventry’s “unhappy fate” and condemned Somerville’s “shameful behaviour,” initially misdated by Mr. Garstin as August 11 but confirmed as August 16 in the records.
Diplomatic Overtures and Zulfikar Khan’s Intervention
Raworth was instructed to secure peace without financial concessions, but Fort St. David’s letters soon requested money and presents for Swarup Singh’s envoys, who offered peace for 6,000 chuckrams annually. A September 4, 1711, letter highlighted Swarup Singh’s challenges: his old age, administrative difficulties, and the war’s heavy costs, which left him unable to pay his troops, forcing them to plunder for subsistence. The English hoped to exploit this, noting that “the extraordinary charges he had incurred… had so impoverished him” that peace might be near. A September 8, 1711, letter from Fort St. George urged Raworth to end the war swiftly to resume trade, suggesting negotiations at Gingee if needed for “honour and interest” to ensure “investment might go on briskly.”
Governor Harrison of Fort St. George sought higher intervention, writing to Nawab Zulfikar Khan Bahadur Nasrat Jang, the Mughal Empire’s Bakshi, on October 11, 1711. The letter recalled Zulfikar Khan’s earlier confirmation of English privileges at Fort St. David (Tevanatam) during his siege of Gingee and pleaded for a Hosbulhocum (imperial order) to compel Swarup Singh to allow the English to “live in quiet and mind our trade.” Harrison emphasized the English’s small presence and trade-focused mission, noting that quarrels with Swarup Singh were “extremely prejudicial” and that his agents might misrepresent the conflict at court.
Peace Prospects and Swarup Singh’s Demands
By September 11, 1711, peace seemed imminent, with a letter noting “a better prospect of peace than ever” as the captives were freed from irons at Gingee, signaling Swarup Singh’s inclination toward negotiation. No further skirmishes occurred after the August 16 battle, as reported on September 27, 1711. Swarup Singh’s peace terms, forwarded to Fort St. David, demanded 30,000 chuckrams for three towns—Padirikuppam, Tiruvendipuram, and Coronatham—near Cuddalore, along with a renunciation of all claims to English bounds, horses, and vests. The Fort St. George Council, in an October 5, 1711, despatch to England, deemed these terms excessive, arguing that Swarup Singh’s demands were justified by the destruction of 50–60,000 pagodas worth of grain, 52 villages, and the death of a pandarrum (village head) at Yembollum.
Governor Harrison sharply criticized Fort St. David’s “unaccountable folly and ill management,” particularly Farmer’s unauthorized destruction, which he believed gave Swarup Singh’s demands “too much justice.” The despatch clarified that former Governor Gabriel Roberts, not the Company, was liable for the renters’ debts, as he had facilitated their escape. The war’s cost—4,000 pagodas monthly, plus stores and provisions—devastated trade, with inhabitants deserting and merchants avoiding contracts, as noted in a November 1711 letter (Madras Minutes and Consultations, pp. 149–150).
Debating the Peace Terms
The Fort St. George Council debated Swarup Singh’s terms, questioning the value of the offered villages and the security of their titles, fearing that future Gingee governors might dispute them, as Swarup Singh had challenged Zulfikar Khan’s grant. The November 1711 letter highlighted the war’s toll: no rent from villages, confined inhabitants requiring provisions, and potential desertion by older residents, all threatening trade. The Council consented to pay the renters’ debts, provided Swarup Singh ceased contesting their grants, but insisted that Roberts’ assets be attached to cover the costs. A letter to Raworth emphasized a “speedy and honourable peace,” noting that “Sarup Singh ought to be made satisfaction for the renters’ debt” but rejecting his broader claims as precarious given Zulfikar Khan’s prior grant.
Final Skirmishes and French Mediation
Minor clashes persisted into 1712. A February 14, 1712, letter reported Gingee forces encamped near Cuddalore at the Tiruvendipuram Vishnu pagoda, seeking divine favor through offerings and oracles for their campaign. Receiving no encouragement, they withdrew dissatisfied. In another engagement near Bandipalayam, English forces from a nearby village repelled Gingee troops, who lost four men. A subsequent scuffle between Bandipalayam and Tiruppapuliyur saw a sergeant with 20 men kill six Gingee soldiers and wound others, forcing a rapid retreat with “great precipitation,” after which hostilities ceased.
To end the war, Fort St. George enlisted M. Hebert, the French Governor of Pondicherry, and Checca Serappa, a crafty Madras merchant known for his cunning, to mediate. Their efforts, combined with the war’s exhaustion, led to peace by May 1712, before news of the 1713 Anglo-French treaty reached India.
The war under Raworth underscored the fragility of Mughal-English relations in the Carnatic, where Swarup Singh’s jagir, worth 12 lakhs of pagodas, clashed with English claims secured from the Marathas and Zulfikar Khan. His defiance of Nawab Sadatullah Khan, who reported 70-lakh-rupee arrears to the Mughal court, and his alliance with Mahabat Khan, who later supported his son Tej Singh (Desing) in 1714, highlighted regional tensions. The conflict’s economic toll—destroyed villages, lost revenue, and disrupted trade—emphasized the high stakes for both sides.
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- After the Battle of Gingee: The Legacy of Raja Desing, October 1714
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