The year 1724 marked a turning point for Gingee fortress, as internal conflicts threatened the stability that Sadatullah Khan had worked to establish. A bloody succession dispute erupted between two key figures: Sadat Tiyar Khan and Abdul Nabi Khan, both vying for control of the strategic fortress.
The confrontation proved fatal for both parties. Abdul Nabi Khan suffered mortal wounds during the fighting, while Sadat Tiyar Khan was killed outright. This violent struggle left Gingee in a precarious position, with competing factions claiming legitimacy over the fort’s administration.
When Sadatullah Khan himself marched to restore order, he encountered unexpected resistance. The followers of Abdul Nabi Khan remained determined to maintain their claims to the fortress, creating a prolonged standoff that weakened Gingee’s defensive capabilities at a critical moment.
The Nizam’s Strategic Response
The timing of these internal conflicts coincided with broader regional instability. In 1725, Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah, who had established virtual independence in the Deccan the previous year, recognized the growing Maratha threat to the Carnatic region.
The Nizam deployed Iwaz Khan with specific instructions to clear the Carnatic of Maratha agents and raiders who had penetrated deep into the territory. This military expedition achieved initial success, as Iwaz Khan systematically drove out Maratha tax-collectors from several strategic locations and replaced them with administrators loyal to the Nizam.
The campaign expanded to include major targets like Trichinopoly and confrontations with Raja Sarfoji of Tanjore, demonstrating the Nizam’s commitment to maintaining Mughal authority in South India.
The Declining Nayak Kingdom
The political situation became more complex due to the weakness of local rulers. Vijayaranga Chockanatha, the Nayak of Madura and Trichinopoly (1706-1732), presided over what historians describe as “one unbroken record of decline towards disruption and ruin.”
This administrative weakness created opportunities for external powers. Raja Sarfoji of Tanjore, facing pressure from multiple directions, appealed to Maharaja Shahu of Satara for military assistance. Shahu’s response demonstrated the expanding scope of Maratha ambitions in South India.
The First Maratha Expedition
Maharaja Shahu dispatched a substantial army under Fateh Singh Bhonsle, who held special authority over the chauth collection in the Carnatic. This expedition included prominent Maratha leaders: Baji Rao (the Peshwa) and Sripat Rao (the Pratinidhi).
The Maratha forces followed their established pattern of extracting tribute from various chiefs across the western plateau, including those at Gadag, Bednore, and Srirangapatnam. However, internal divisions weakened their effectiveness.
Command structure problems plagued the expedition. Fateh Singh showed indifference toward his soldiers’ welfare, while the Pratinidhi harboured resentment against the Peshwa. These leadership conflicts contributed to heavy Maratha losses during the campaign.
The Nizam’s Diplomatic Strategy
Nizam-ul-Mulk employed sophisticated diplomatic tactics to counter Maratha expansion. He successfully cultivated the Pratinidhi’s goodwill and offered him a jaghir in Berar, an arrangement that received Maharaja Shahu’s approval.
The Nizam’s next strategic move involved exploiting succession disputes within the Maratha leadership. He deliberately claimed ignorance about the respective claims of Shahu and his cousin to the Maratha throne, using this uncertainty to withhold chauth and sardeshmukhi payments from the six Mughal Deccan provinces under his control.
This diplomatic manoeuvring extended to winning over Sambhaji, Shahu’s rival prince, thereby creating additional pressure on the main Maratha leadership.
The Treaty of Mungi Shevgaon
Despite his diplomatic successes, the Nizam ultimately could not resist Shahu’s overwhelming power. The conflict reached resolution through the Treaty of Mungi Shevgaon in March 1728, which represented a compromise between the competing powers.
This treaty marked the end of the immediate military confrontation but established precedents for future interactions between the Nizam and Maratha forces in South India.
Failed Maratha Expeditions
The Marathas launched two major expeditions into South India during this period, both under Fateh Singh Bhonsle’s command. The first expedition, known as the Chitaldrug expedition, failed to achieve its objectives despite initial momentum.
A second expedition, called the Seringapatam expedition, received assistance from Raja Tukoji but similarly ended without significant territorial gains. Neither expedition succeeded in penetrating the heart of the Carnatic proper.
Maharaja Shahu’s frustration with these outcomes led him to question Fateh Singh’s commitment, asking why he hadn’t remained in the Carnatic long enough to secure effective conquest.
Established Maratha Positions
The Maratha interest in the Carnatic wasn’t merely opportunistic. Beyond the Tanjore kingdom controlled by the younger Bhonsle branch, Maratha chiefs had established strategic positions throughout the region.
The Ghorepades controlled Gooty, while other Maratha commanders held outposts at Belgaum, Koppal, Sandur, Bellary, Sira, Bangalore, and Kolar. Maharaja Shahu had specifically granted Fateh Singh Bhonsle the jaghir of Akalkot to monitor Carnatic affairs.
Strategic Motivations
Maharaja Shahu’s ambitions extended beyond mere raiding. He sought to annex the entire Carnatic to his Swarajya, claiming legitimacy through the conditions of the 1718 treaty ratified by the Emperor.
The recent establishment of “Muhammadan sway” in the Carnatic’s heartland created perceived opportunities for Maratha expansion. Additionally, the potential alliance with Raja Tukoji of Tanjore offered strategic advantages for any comprehensive conquest attempt.
The Nizam’s Capital Relocation
Recognising the strategic importance of South Indian affairs, the Nizam made a significant administrative decision in 1726. He transferred his capital from Aurangabad to Hyderabad, positioning himself closer to both the Carnatic and Mysore regions.
This relocation served multiple purposes. It enhanced his ability to respond quickly to Maratha incursions while allowing him to conduct military and diplomatic operations with greater secrecy from the Satara court’s observation.
The move to Hyderabad represented a clear acknowledgement that South India had become central to the Nizam’s strategic priorities and that effective governance required proximity to these contested territories.
Historical Significance
The conflicts at Gingee between 1724-1728 illustrate the complex multi-party struggles that characterised 18th-century South Indian politics. The internal succession dispute, Maratha expansion attempts, and the Nizam’s defensive strategies all contributed to reshaping regional power dynamics.
These events marked Gingee’s continued decline from its former prominence while demonstrating how local fortress politics connected to broader imperial ambitions across the Deccan and Carnatic regions.
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