The protracted war between Raja Swarup Singh Bundela, commander of Gingee Fort, and the English East India Company at Fort St. David, sparked by the 1710 capture of two officers, Lieutenant James Hugonin and Ensign Ray, reached a breaking point by 1712. The conflict’s immense costs—economic, social, and military—forced both sides to seek peace, culminating in a treaty signed on May 5, 1712, through French mediation. Drawing from Fort St. David consultations, Fort St. George correspondence, and despatches to England, this blog post explores the factors that drove the resolution, including the war’s toll on trade, village revenues, and military discipline, as well as Swarup Singh’s losses and formidable power.
The English Company’s Burdens: Economic and Social Toll
The war, lasting from 1710 to 1712, inflicted severe economic damage on the English East India Company, as detailed in a despatch from the Directors in England approving the peace terms. The conflict cost 5,000 pagodas monthly, totaling 12,000 pagodas for the treaty, alongside the complete loss of village revenues, wasted stores, and provisions. The disruption halted cultivation and trade, with inhabitants confined within Fort St. David’s bounds requiring grain and necessities, as many threatened to desert. Merchants, wary of the instability, refused to engage in contracts, crippling the Company’s investment, as noted: “The war had been very injurious to the investment and trade of the Company.”
Military discipline also faltered, with the “depraved conduct of the soldiers and the disorders within their ranks” urging the need for peace. A despatch emphasized that the treaty was driven not by fear but by the necessity to preserve the settlement: “Not fear of ourselves but the preservation of the settlement was the only inducement to pay so much money for the fomented peace.” The Directors acknowledged the Council’s efforts, stating, “We believe you did your best in the whole affair including the negotiations,” despite the “prodigious charge” and “dubious events of the war.”
Swarup Singh’s Losses: A Strained War Effort
Swarup Singh faced equally severe losses, as English forces under Captain Roach plundered villages in the Valudavur and Gingee districts, destroying grain and approximately 52 villages, including Yembollum. A September 4, 1711, letter to Fort St. George noted the “extra-ordinary charges” Swarup Singh incurred, which “so impoverished him that he could not pay his troops.” This financial strain forced his soldiers to plunder for subsistence, described as being done “with the utmost severity.” The devastation of his territory, combined with the inability to maintain his forces, pressured Swarup Singh to negotiate, as his resources were stretched thin by the prolonged conflict.
The Power of Swarup Singh: A Formidable Adversary
English records portray Swarup Singh as a “potent prince” and “considerable prince,” highlighting his significant influence. A letter praised the English for showing “great courage against so potent a prince as the Raja of Gingee,” noting his Rajput heritage, with one account stating, “This Mughal’s mother was of that family.” The Directors, while regretting the war’s costs, acknowledged Swarup Singh’s strength, stating, “The present Raja is a tributary to the Mughal and has a considerable revenue with which he maintains a strong force.” His jagir, worth 12 lakhs of pagodas, underscored his capacity to sustain a formidable military presence.
However, the Directors believed the English had overestimated Swarup Singh’s power, suggesting that Mr. Fraser’s “wrong notion” of his strength allowed tensions to escalate. They questioned why Swarup Singh “should not have dared to seize our people in Pitt’s time,” indicating a miscalculation that prolonged the conflict. Despite this, Swarup Singh’s wealth and military might, supported by allies like Mahabat Khan, made him a formidable adversary, pushing the English toward a costly settlement.
The Treaty and Its Resolution
The peace treaty, signed on May 5, 1712, through M. Hebert’s mediation, addressed these pressures. Swarup Singh granted the English perpetual rights to Tiruvendipuram, Padirikuppam, and Carunatham, transferred the renters’ debt, and released the captives, while the English paid 12,000 pagodas, including a 1,000-pagoda present. The treaty ensured freedom of trade, a lasting peace, and consequences for violations, restoring tranquility. A May 5, 1712, letter expressed hope that the captives’ return would end disruptions to cultivation and trade, while a May 26 letter confirmed their delivery to Pondicherry. A later April 30, 1715, letter noted Benyon’s expenses during negotiations, with Hebert receiving only a horse and vestments for his efforts.
The 1712 treaty resolved a conflict rooted in Swarup Singh’s grievances over unpaid renters’ debts, facilitated by former Governor Gabriel Roberts, and exacerbated by English raids. Swarup Singh’s jagir, secured after Zulfikar Khan’s conquest of Gingee, clashed with English claims from Ramaraja and Zulfikar Khan. His defiance of Nawab Sadatullah Khan, who reported 70-lakh-rupee arrears, underscored regional tensions. The war’s toll—lost revenues, plundered villages, and military losses—forced both sides to compromise.
Note: This post is based on Fort St. David consultations, Fort St. George correspondence, and English despatches for a comprehensive account of the causes behind the May 1712 peace treaty with Swarup Singh
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